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Price Transparency in the Voluntary Price Reporting System for Live Cattle: Theory and
Empirical Evidence
ABSTRACT
The ability of the former federal voluntary price reporting system to facilitate market efficiency in the
cash markets for U.S. livestock was questioned by producer groups and academic researchers prior to
implementation of federal mandatory price reporting regulations. In the cash market for slaughter cattle,
concerns raised in the literature centered on the effect of thinning cash markets and strategic price
reporting behavior on the robustness of voluntary cash price reports issued by the USDA-Agricultural
Marketing Services.
A theoretical framework is developed describing the interregional spatial linkages between cash
markets and price reporting regimes (mandatory versus voluntary). Data from South Dakota and
Nebraska cash markets for live cattle are used to test if the conditions necessary for interregional price
transparency did exist prior to implementation of federal price reporting regulations. A set of testable
hypotheses, based on the theoretical framework, is developed to test if the concerns raised in the
literature about the voluntary price reporting system can be empirically verified.
The empirical results do not support the literature’s proposition that the voluntary price reporting
system for live cattle failed to provide timely and accurate market price information to the cash market
prior to the implementation of the federal mandatory price reporting system in South Dakota and
Nebraska. Furthermore, empirical evidence does not support the supposition that a thinning cash
market or strategic price reporting had a significant negative effect on the AMS voluntary price reporting
system’s accuracy or timely transmission of price information. Therefore, we conclude that the AMS
voluntary price reporting system provided price transparency for South Dakota and Nebraska producers
selling in the cash market and contributed to the price discovery process.

1

Price Transparency in the Voluntary Price Reporting System for Live Cattle: Theory and
Empirical Evidence

Passage of mandatory livestock price reporting (MPR) legislation at the federal level is the direct result of
concerns raised over the reliability of the voluntary price reporting (VPR) system to provide accurate and
timely information to market participants.1 This legislation ended individual state mandatory livestock
price reporting regimes and discontinued the voluntary reporting of slaughter cattle sales by the
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).2
Structural change occurring in the livestock industry over the last fifty years has often been cited
as the reason for reforming the public price reporting mechanism for livestock markets. The literature on
public price reporting suggests that increased concentration has contributed to a thinning of cash
transaction information available to the public and provided packers and feedlots a potential opportunity
to engage in strategic price reporting under the AMS-VPR system. The general conclusion arrived at in
the literature is that the AMS-VPR system’s ability to provide timely and accurate price reports had been
significantly degraded before its demise in 2001.
However, recent evidence in the literature suggests that the VPR system may not have lost its
ability to function as an efficient price transmission mechanism. In a recent paper by Fausti and Diersen
(2004), the robustness of the VPR system as a price transmission mechanism was empirically verified in

1

Increased concentration in both the packing and feedlot industries and the use of alternative marketing
arrangements (marketing agreements, forward contracts, etc.), have resulted in the movement away from terminal
market transactions by market participants over the last 30 years. In the spot market for cattle, the use of terminal
markets has declined from 30% in 1977 to 13% in 1999 (GIP SA 200 2). Furthermore, the four largest packers
control 82 % o f steer and heifer slaughter b ut only purchase 3.7 % o f total slaughter from term inal markets. A
number of econom ists have concluded that these structural changes in the cattle industry has resulted in thinning
markets. Possible consequences include hampering price discovery, reducing market transparency, and degrading
the effectiveness of the vo luntary price rep orting system. Se e for examp le Ba stian et al. (2 001 ) or Azzam (2003).
2

National mandatory livestock price reporting legislation was passed in October 1999 and supplanted
state legislation. The first federal publicly issued mandatory price report was released on April 2, 2001, ending
individual state re porting activity. Regional AM S voluntary livestock reports also ended at this time, e.g. Montana
Direct, Washington/Oregon Direct, etc.
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the South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for dressed weight steers. The existence of price
transparency prior to federal MPR regulations raises questions about the validity of the concerns raised in
the literature advocating reform of the public price reporting system because the VPR system’s price
transmission mechanism was severely flawed. This issue does have policy implications because the MPR
legislation is due to expire in September of 2005.
We propose a simple interregional spatial equilibrium model which incorporates a VPR system.
From the model, the necessary conditions for the existence of spatial equilibrium and spatial price
transparency are derived.3 It is demonstrated that a significant presence of a thinning market effect and/or
strategic price reporting behavior will distort the spatial price relationship being transmitted by the VPR
system. The consequence of this distortion is the loss of spatial price transparency, rendering the VPR
system inefficient. An empirical model consistent with the theoretical framework is proposed. A set of
hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework and tested to determine if the VPR system was
rendered inefficient because of thinning markets and/or strategic price reporting as asserted in the earlier
literature.
Literature Review
Two related issues raised in the public price reporting literature which cast doubt upon the ability of the
VPR system to provide accurate and timely price reports are 1) the failure of industry participants to
report an estimated 35 to 40 percent of all cattle transactions (USDA-GIPSA 1998) and 2) the use of
captive supply mechanisms by packers reduces cash market transactions.4 The literature contends that

3

Fausti and Diersen (2004) define price transparency as “a market condition where all relevant information
on transaction p rices is publicly available to all market participants.” The y define spatial price transpa rency as “
price transparenc y existing between spatially linked interregio nal markets.”
4

T he nu mb er o f stu dies in th e literature on public pric e re porting ha ve questione d the a cc ura cy of the AMS
VPR system relative to a MPR regime (And erson et al 1998, Bastian et al 2001, Azzam 200 3). These studies assert
that mo ving to a mand atory p rice rep orting system will improve the availability of public inform ation d rama tically
by prohibiting the no nreporting o f transactions. The implementation of mandatory price reporting in the market for
slaughter cattle has imp roved public rep orting o f non-sp ot market transaction s.

2

these developments in the slaughter cattle market has contributed to a thinning market phenomenon and
degraded the VPR system for fed cattle.5

A common theoretical linkage in this literature is that if you

increase price uncertainty, you decrease market efficiency. These studies basically assume Tomek’s
thinning market phenomenon was occurring in the voluntary price reporting mechanism, increasing price
uncertainty.6 Critics of VPR conclude that a full information system is more efficient because it reduces
price uncertainty and improves market efficiency relative to an incomplete information system. However,
this branch of the literature does not provide any insight on if the AMS-VPR system actually reached the
point where thinning market information had materially effected market transparency.
A third issue, raised by Koontz (1999), is the potential for packers and feedlots to engage in
strategic price reporting during periods of sharp price movements in the market when transaction prices
are voluntarily reported. Koontz suggests that packers will not report transaction prices higher than the
average price paid when price is rising. On the other hand, feedlots will not report sale prices below the
average when price is falling. Given the AMS did not report a transaction price unless it could confirm
both sides of the trade, in periods of sharp price movements the weighted average price reported by the
AMS would not reflect the actual weighted average price in the market if buyers and sellers behaved
strategically. Conclusive empirical evidence has been not reported in the literature supporting the
presence of strategic price reporting behavior. However, strategic price reporting, if it were widespread
during periods of sharp price movements, would exacerbate the thinning market problem during these
periods.

5

The conce pt of a thin market in this context refers to the decline in reported transactions as a percentage
of total transactio ns (T ome k 1980).
6

Azzam (2003, p.388) discusses increased transparency in terms of reduced uncertainty over livestock
prices unde r a mandatory system relative to voluntary price reporting system. T he und erlying premise of Azzam’s
assumption is that increased uncertainty is the result of fewer transactions being reported under a voluntary system,
resulting in increased price dispersion relative to ac tual dispersion of market transaction prices. In simple terms,
Azzam refers to the issue as analogous to a sampling issue.
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Empirical evidence in support of the proposition that the AMS-VPR system was an efficient price
transmission mechanism in the period just prior to the implementation of federal MPR regulations is
presented in a paper by Fausti and Diersen (2004). Fausti and Diersen adopt the methodology found in
the recent literature on the relationship between competitive spatial equilibrium and market integration
(Barrett and Li 2002, McNew 1996, McNew and Fackler 1997) . They provide empirical evidence that
the spatial price relationship between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for dressed weight steers
fulfills the conditions necessary for the existence of spatial price transparency.
Recent literature on the relationship between competitive spatial equilibrium and market
integration (Barrett and Li 2002, McNew 1996, McNew and Fackler 1997) provides an alternative
methodology for analyzing the robustness of price transparency within the context of mandatory versus
voluntary price reporting. When interregional trade is nonnegative, Barrett and Li note that a long-run
competitive spatial equilibrium condition holds when marginal profit from arbitrage activity is equal to
zero. Under this condition, when trade is positive, regional price differentials move “one-for-one with the
costs of spatial arbitrage” in the long-run (Barrett and Li p.293). Market integration, however, as
discussed in the contestable market literature “implies the transfer of Walrasian excess demand from one
market to another, manifest in the physical flow of a commodity, the transmission of price shocks from
one market to another, or both” (Barrett and Li p.293). Market integration implies an efficient short-run
market adjustment mechanism restoring a market to its long-run equilibrium condition.
The concept of spatial price transparency discussed in the paper by Fausti and Diersen is
analogous to Barrett and Li’s concept of “perfect integration.” The necessary conditions for the existence
of spatial price transparency are 1) interregional competitive spatial equilibrium, and 2) interregional
market integration. Jointly, these two conditions are sufficient for the existence of spatial price
transparency. An example of an application of Barrett and Li’s work for livestock markets begin with the
assumption that there are two spatially related regional markets. If one of the spatially related markets
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relies on a VPR system to provide market information, then it is possible either a thinning market or a
strategic price reporting effect can result in marginal profits from spatial arbitrage being non-zero in the
long run. This implies competitive spatial equilibrium will not exist between these two markets. In this
case, according to Barrett and Li, the interregional market relationship would be defined as “imperfect
integration” when trade is positive. This implies that price shocks are transmitted from one market to
another, but the price signal from the VPR system would also contain a non-zero marginal arbitrage profit
component (economic rent) that some proportion of market participants would not be aware of. Thus, the
full information condition of spatial price transparency, as defined by Fausti and Diersen, is violated.
In the framework developed below, we investigate the efficiency of the AMS-VPR system. The
focus will be on determining the nature of the spatial relationship between two spatially related cash
markets for live slaughter cattle (South Dakota and Nebraska) and their respective price reporting regimes.
The conclusion will be based on if there is evidence of either thinning markets or strategic price reporting
affecting the interregional spatial price relationship in these markets.
Regional Mandatory Price Reporting Regimes
The purpose of regional livestock MPR laws is to require all livestock transactions to be reported to the
designated government agency.7 In theory, this implies complete price transparency in cash markets. The
price revealed in a MPR ( PtMA) for region A, in period t, equals the actual weighted average market price
(PtA ) for cash sales in period t for the reporting region plus a random error:
(1) PMA(ItA ) = PtA + gt.8
The symbol I denotes the information set containing all transaction data generated in region A and
collected by the price reporting agency. The variable (g) denotes random error occurring in the data

7

Several states passed MPR regulations prior to implementation of federal MPR regulations in 2001 (IA,
MN , MO , NE, and SD ).
8

This assumption assumes full com pliance with price rep orting re gulation s by all market p articipa nts. It is
assumed transaction costs associated with price reporting are zero and so the intercept term is dropped.
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collection and reporting process. If one assumes full industry compliance (complete information), then:
E(gt*ItA )=0, VAR(gt*ItA ) =

F2gt , and

E(PtM A*ItA ) = PtA .9 Assuming the government’s data collection

procedures adhere to standardized collection and evaluation practices, then a unidirectional,
instantaneous, and complete integrated relationship between PtA and PtM A exists in the context of a price
reporting relationship.10
Voluntary Price Reporting Regimes
The information set ( ItB ) contains transaction price information for region B, voluntarily reported to the
price reporting agency. The information set determines the price revealed in the VPR system (PtVB ), at
time t, plus a random error:
(2) PVB (ItB ) = PtB + <t .
PtB is the actual market weighted average transaction price in region B, and <t is the random error term
resulting from random error in the data collection and reporting process. Next, let it be assumed that the
VPR system draws a large enough sample when constructing ItB that the sample is representative of the
market.11 Hence, the VPR system is an efficient conduit for the transmission of market information on
slaughter cattle transactions in region B. This implies: E(PtVB *ItB )= PtB , given that E(<t*ItB )=0 and
VAR(<t*ItB )=F <t. Assuming the government’s data collection procedures adhere to standardized
2

collection and evaluation practices, then an unidirectional, instantaneous, and complete integrated
relationship between PtB and PtVB exists in the context of a price reporting relationship.12

9

Note that the mathematical op erators E an d VA R are co nditional expectation and variance op erators,
respe ctively.
10

The integra ted relationship exists if there is no systematic comp onent associated with the error term .

11

. The assumption is that the expected value of collected transaction prices is an unbiased estimate of
equilibrium price and is consisten t with Tome k (19 80).
12

The requirement for an integrated relationship between actual and reported market prices is that the error

term is stationary. S tationary is impo sed b y the assumptio ns: that E(<t*ItB )=0 and VAR(<t*ItB )=F <t. This
implies that there is not a systematic component affecting the mean and variance of the error term.
2

6

A thinning market or strategic price reporting effect will alter the information set and effect the
first and second moments of the distribution of the error term. With respect to E(<t*ItB )=0 and
VAR(<t*ItB )=F <t assumptions, one or both could be violated. This implies that either E(<t*ItB ) 0 or
2

VAR(<t*ItB ) changes as the content of the information set changes. These types of potential flaws in the
AMS-VPR system have been alluded to by the proponents of federal mandatory price reporting. For
example: 1) If buyers and sellers of slaughter cattle are behaving strategically when reporting transaction
prices, then <t will not have a constant mean over time13 , and 2) if the volume of transactions being
reported is diminished to the point of affecting the distribution of the VPR then <t will experience an
increase in its variance over time.14 If either one of these conditions or both are present, then the
relationship between PtVB and PtB will not be stationary. This implies that VPRs will not have a long-run
equilibrium relationship with actual market transactions. In this case, it is not possible for the two price
series to achieve price transparency. This implies the VPR system is fundamentally flawed in region B.
This is the basic argument made in the earlier literature.
Interregional Slaughter Cattle Production and Interregional Spatial Equilibrium: A Simple Model
Assume regions A and B are two spatially related regions for the production of slaughter cattle. Assume
the production capacity of slaughter cattle in region A is defined as being small relative to B. Assume
region B is defined as a centralized market and region A as a decentralized market.15 The difference
between the two regions is slaughter cattle production capacity and: a) region B has processing facilities
and a voluntary public price reporting regime, and b) region A has a mandatory price reporting regime and

13

If E( <t*I tB) 0 then E(P tVR*I tB) P tB . This implies the voluntary price report is biased. This problem
could arise if buyers and sellers are engaged in strategic price reporting. Strategic price reporting will result in the
mean of the error term shifting whenever the market experiences sharp p rice movements.
14

If there are transactions not reported, then the content of the information set declines as the proportion of
transactions reported declines (thinning markets), resulting in the variance of the error term (VAR( <t*I tB)) increasing
over time as markets bec ome thinner (T ome k 1980).
15

The term centralized infers the ab ility of a region to produce, ma rket, and process slaughter cattle

internally.
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no processing facilities. Assume region A produces an excess supply of slaughter cattle because of a lack
of processing facilities. Assume region B has excess demand for slaughter cattle due to processing
facilities having excess capacity. Producers in region A have a choice of selling their live cattle to a field
representative of a processing firm located in region B or selling their cattle in region A to an intermediary
(independent order buyer). The intermediary will assume the risk of delivering the cattle to the processing
facility in region B and profit from any short-run arbitrage activity. Therefore, all slaughter cattle flow
from region A to region B.16
Next, assume the market for slaughter cattle is competitive in regions A and B. This implies that
opportunities for interregional arbitrage dissipate quickly.17 This infers that the cash markets for slaughter
cattle in regions A and B are spatially integrated and this relationship can be defined as:
(3) PtA = " + PtB + Rt , where " is the intercept term capturing transactions cost and Rt is the random error
term and E(Rt) = 0 and Var(Rt) = F2 R . It is assumed that the cash markets in regions A and B adhere to
t

zero marginal profit condition associated with competitive spatial equilibrium.
Diagram I depicts the spatial relationships across interregional markets as discussed above.

16

The discussion reflects the production and marketing of slaughter cattle in South Dakota. There are no
modern commercial beef packing plants in South Dakota. A majority of South Dakota slaughter cattle are shipped
out of state for processing.
17

This implies the long-run competitive spatial equilibrium is consistent with marginal profit from
arbitrage activity being equal to zero This assumption is consistent with B arrett and Li, and M cNew and Fackler.
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Diagram I: Interregional Markets and the Direction of Price Transmission.
Price reporting re gime

Region A

P MA

Regional C ash M arket

PA

#1

(SD)

#4

#3

#2
Region B
P VB
PB
(NEB)
Line #1 represents eq.1, the spatial relationship and direction of price transmission
between actual and reported transactions resulting from government enforcement of mandatory price
reporting regulations in region A. Line #2 represents eq. 2, the spatial relationship between actual
and voluntary reported transaction prices released by the reporting agency in region B. Line #3
represents eq. 3, the assumed spatial relationship between regions A and B resulting from
com petitive sp atial arbitrage. Line #4 repre sents eq .4, the possible interregional spatial relationship
between the two independent price reports: the mandatory price report in region A and the voluntary
price report in region B eq 4. Note: The PDF conversion process failed to copy the directional
arrows. Information flows from PB to P VB and to P A and from PA to P MA.

The MPR and VPR systems depicted in diagram I reflect information on transaction prices from
their respective cash markets. The cash markets are assumed to be in equilibrium as a result of competitive
spatial arbitrage. Therefore, if information on transaction prices in region B is not distorted by a thinning
market phenomenon or a strategic price reporting effect, then the information contained in the MPR from
regional A will mirror the information contained in the VPR from region B. The interregional spatial
relationship between region A’s mandatory price report and region B’s voluntary price report depicted in
diagram I is defined as follows:
(4) PtMA = a + PtVB + et, where (a) denotes the intercept term reflecting transaction cost, and e t is the
random error term. Assuming no market distortions, then E(et) = 0, and Var(et) = F2 e is constant over
t
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time. This implies the spatial relationship between MPR and VPR reflects the competitive spatial
equilibrium that exists between the cash markets in regions A and B.
However, the literature contends that this competitive spatial equilibrium relationship in the cash
market is not reflected in the AMS-VPR system because of market distortions. The economic
implications of three market distortions on the reliability of the information contained in a VPR is
investigated next.
Case I: Positive Marginal Profit from Spatial Arbitrage in the Long Run
The first case assumes that competitive spatial arbitrage breaks down in the cash markets between regions
A and B. Assume long-run marginal profit to arbitrage is positive. That implies region B buyers of
slaughter cattle can earn positive economic rent by purchasing region A’s cattle. If positive profit persists
in the long run and is stationary, then it is possible for a noncompetitive spatial equilibrium to exist
between the cash markets in regions A and B.18 Positive marginal profit would be captured in the
intercept term (") defined in eq. 3. The intercept term would then capture transaction cost and positive
economic rent.19 This relationship would also be reflected in the spatial equilibrium relationship between
the MPR and VPR as defined in equation 4.
If long run marginal profit to spatial arbitrage is positive and stationary, then this situation would
be consistent with Barrett and Li’s case of “imperfect integration.” We can describe this situation as
noncompetitive spatial equilibrium. However, if long-run economic profit from arbitrage is positive and
nonstationary, then linear cointegration techniques would no longer be a robust method for estimating the

18

There is no emp irical evid ence that the price differential between live cattle prices paid in South
Dakota and live cattle prices pa id in N ebraska is greater than the transport and handling cost of delivering S outh
Dakota live cattle to the Nebrask a market.
19

This can b e easily demo nstrated by rewriting eq.4 as E[P tMA ]- E[P tVB ]= E[a]+ E[e t] and assuming $
denotes positive economic rent occurring in the cash market. Thus, in the cash market equation (eq.3) transaction
cost is denote by " and economic rent is denote b y $: P tA = " + $+ P tB + Rt . Substituting in equations 1&2 for
E[P tMA ] and E[P tVB] , and then substituting " + $+ P tB + Rt for P tA you have E[" + $+ P tB + Rt ]-E[ PtB + <t ] = E[a]+
E[e t]. Taking the realization of the expected values on both sides of the equality sign and you have: a = " + $.
Thus, the intercept term of the cointegrating equa tion (eq .4) captures transaction co st and economic rent.
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spatial price relationship between interregional markets. The problem arises because combining
stationary transaction cost with nonstationary economic rent from arbitrage would render the error term in
eq.4 non stationary. 20 As a consequence, linear cointegration estimation techniques would fail to find a
cointegrated relationship between P tMA and P tVB . In either case, spatial price transparency will not exist
because full information on market transactions will not be available to all market participants.

Case II: Thinning Markets
The second market distortion to be discussed is thinning market information. If the amount of transaction
information voluntarily reported declines over time in region B, then sampling variability associated with
the VPR system for region B will increase. This implies the variance of the interregional spatial price
relationship will increase as market information becomes thinner. If the variance increases as market
information becomes thinner, then the error term in eq. 4 will not be stationary. 21 As a consequence,
linear cointegration estimation techniques would fail to find a cointegrated relationship between P tMA and
P tVB .

In either case, spatial price transparency will not exist because full information on market

transactions will not be available to all market participants.

Case III: Strategic Price Reporting
The third market distortion to be discussed is strategic price reporting behavior. If buyers and sellers
behave strategically during periods of sharp price movements, then the average transaction price in the
cash market will not equal the average transaction price reported to and by the VPR agency in region B.
Specifically, strategic price reporting will result in the average transaction price in the cash market being
above (below) the voluntarily reported average price during periods of sharp upward (downward) price

20

The literature (Barrett and Li, McNew, McNew and Flacker, etc) indicates that linear cointegration
techniques are inadequate when transactions cost are not stationary. The linear combination of a stationary and
nonstationary time series is nonstationary (Gujarati, p.805).
21

W e are assuming a mean preserving increase in dispersion. This increase in variance can easily be shown
by using the definition: Var (P tMA - P tVB) = Var(P tMA ) + Var( P tVB) -2Cov(P tMA, P tVB) = Var( et ). If Var( P tVB)
increases, then Var( et ) increases.
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movements. Strategic price reporting could also affect dispersion because it will reduce the proportion of
cash transactions reported during sharp market moves, contributing to the thinning of market information.
If this market distortion only occurs during sharp price movements and sharp price movements are random
events, then the first and second moments of the distribution of the error term equations 2 and 4 will be
affected as discussed in footnotes 13 and 21.
Empirically, spatial equilibrium is a long-run concept which requires certain conditions to be
present in the spatial relationship of two time series variables. Statistical evidence of a cointegrated
relationship between PtMA and PtVB is necessary to conclude a long-run spatial equilibrium exists between
the cash markets and the associated price reporting systems.22 A cointegrated relationship between PtM A
and PtVB is present if et is stationary.23 The concerns raised in the literature about thinning market
information, strategic price reporting, and non-competitive spatial arbitrage on market efficiency can be
interpreted as the literature being concerned that these market distorting effects are disrupting the spatial
equilibrium relationship between AMS-VPR and actual cash market transactions.
This discussion leads to a set of testable propositions:
A) If the spatial price relationship estimated by regressing PtM A on PtVB is found to be cointegrated, then
there is evidence of a long run competitive spatial equilibrium. The implication of the presence of a long
run competitive equilibrium is that if market distortions did exist during the era of VPR, they did not have
a material effect on the ability of the VPR to reflect the equilibrium relationship between the Nebraska
and South Dakota cash markets.

22

If a cointegrated relationship is not empirically verified then there are two possibilities: a competitive
spatial equilibrium does not exist between the two cash m arkets o r the V PR system in re gion B is fundamentally
flawed.
23

The literature (Barrett and Li, McNew, McNew and Flacker, etc) indicates that linear cointegration
techniq ues are inadequate when transactions co st are no t stationary, trade is b idirectional, or trade is discontinuous.
Only the issue of nonstationary transaction cost poses a potential problem. The other two potential problems are not
relevant to the theoretical framework developed in this paper. However, empirical results discussed later indicate that
transac tion co st are stationary.
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B) If the spatial price relationship estimated by regressing PtM A on PtVB is found to be cointegrated and the
empirical estimate of the intercept term of the cointegrating regression, ", is found to be stationary,
significant, and of a magnitude consistent with a reasonable estimate of transactions cost for shipping
cattle from South Dakota to Nebraska, then we can conclude that the assumption of zero marginal profit to
spatial arbitrage is reasonable.
These propositions will be revisited during the discussion of the empirical results.
Interregional Spatial Integration and Price Transparency
According to the recent literature (e.g. Barret and Li), market integration is defined as the ability of linked
markets to transfer changes in market supply and demand conditions from one market to another via the
transmission of price shocks, commodity movements, or both. Efficient transmission of price shocks is
consistent with the definition of price transparency requiring the market mechanism to provide accurate
and timely price information to market participants.
To test if the AMS-VPR system did fully transmit price shocks from one region to another in a
timely fashion, an error correction model (ECM) is proposed. The purpose of the ECM is to test the
robustness of the short-run-equilibrium price-shock-adjustment-mechanism, to determine if the MPR
series in region A (South Dakota) and the VPR series in region B (Nebraska) are spatially integrated.
Adopting the ECM framework to model the price transmission process across interregional
markets will allow us to define the price transmission process (eq. 5). According to Granger (1981, 1983),
two cointegrated series (eq. 4) can be expressed as a simple error correction model:
(5) ) PtMA = (0 + (1 ) PtVB + (2 et-1.
The change in the equilibrium price of slaughter cattle from period t-1 to t in region A is reflected
in ) PtMA . The change in the equilibrium price of slaughter cattle from period t-1 to t in region B is
reflected in ) PtVB . The intercept term (0 ((0 = )a ) reflects changes in the long-run equilibrium

13

relationship due to the effect of the price shock on transaction cost levels.24 The slope parameter (1 ( 0#(1
#1) captures the transmission of the price shock occurring in region B, in time period t, to region A. If
(1 =1, then this would indicate “instantaneous perfect integration” as defined by Barrett and Li. However,
a weaker condition discussed by Barrett and Li is “perfect integration,” which only requires that the entire
price shock be transmitted without a specific duration-of-time constraint. The variable et-1 reflects the
deviation from parity remaining to be transmitted from region B to region A as a result of the price shock
at time t. The deviation from parity adjustment parameter (2 ( 0#(2 #1) captures the transmission of the
price shock residual to region A.
The interregional ECM modeling of the price shock transmission process is done in a discrete
time framework to determine if the time-path of the adjustment process is consistent with Barrett and Li’s
definition of perfect integration. First, assume that the spatial relationships outlined in diagram I adhere to
the conditions necessary for competitive spatial equilibrium. Next, assume a fixed portion of the price
shock ((1 = (2 ) is transmitted from region B to region A each period, and (0 =0.25 Now, assume that a
price shock at time t occurs in region B. The price shock disrupts the long-run equilibrium between
regional transaction prices PtA and PtB . This disruption will be reflected in the respective price reports
PtMA and PtVB . In period t, the proportion of the price shock transmitted to region A and reflected in PtM A
is:
(6) )PtMA = (1 )PtVB .
Where et = )PtVB - (1 )PtVB is the residual of the price shock not yet transmitted to region A.
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Barrett and Li discuss the effect of nonstationary transaction costs on the robustness on linear ECM
models. We assume (0=0, and empirical evidence presented later in the paper support this assumption.
25

W e assum e the market m echanism for the transmission of price sho cks across regions is time invariant.
Empirical evidence p resented later indicates the fixed proportion assumptio n is robust.
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In period t+1, the proportion of the price shock transmitted to region A is the residual et multiplied by (1 .
The transmission process continues until the entire shock is transmitted to region A. Rewriting the price
shock transmission process in a compact form allows us to define the spatial price transmission equation:
(7)

.

Equation 7 confirms that the proposed ECM framework is consistent with Barret and Li’s
definition of perfect integration occurring between regions A and B whenever (0 =0, and 0<(1 <1.26
Instantaneous perfect integration occurs whenever i=0, (0 =0, (1 = (2 , and (1 =1. This type of integration
is the type one would associate with financial markets. Barret and Li’s segmented equilibrium would
occur if (0 =0, (1 =0, and there was no movement of slaughter cattle from region A to B.
Empirical estimation of parameters (1 and (2 in eq. 5 will provide statistical evidence of whether
spatial integration existed between PtMA and PtVB . If both (1 and (2 are statistically significant we can
conclude that the spatial relationships in diagram I are integrated. The implication under this scenario is
that the AMS Nebraska voluntary price report did engender spatial price transparency in Nebraska and
South Dakota cash markets.
Methodology
For South Dakota and Nebraska, we intend to empirically investigate the spatial relationships
hypothesized in diagram I. The time period selected is the 19-month period just before federal mandatory
price reporting rules went into effect. A test for the presence of cointegration will provide empirical
evidence on the possible existence of long-run spatial equilibrium relationships discussed above (diagram
I). If a long-run equilibrium relationship is found, then an error correction mechanism (ECM) modeling

26

Give n that

= 1, and thus

Li’s requirement of co mple te price shock transm ission for perfect integration is me t.
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. Therefore, Barret and

approach will be used to investigate the short-run disequilibrium adjustment process to determine if there
is empirical evidence of spatial integration between regional price reporting systems.
First, unit root tests will be conducted to determine which of the selected price series are nonstationary. 27 Engle and Granger (1987) state that if two series are I(1) then it is possible that a linear
combination of the two series is I(0). Engle and Granger propose a cointegrating regression: regressing
one I(1) series on another I(1) series.

The residual series generated by the cointegration regression will

be tested for the existence of a unit root to determine if the two price series are cointegrated. Next, based
on the work by Granger (1981, 1983), the Granger Representation Theorem states that if two time series
variables are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can be expressed as an error correction
mechanism (ECM).
Data
In July of 1999 South Dakota Codified Law: Chapter 40-15B (SDCL 2000) required mandatory livestock
price reporting in South Dakota to begin on Sept 1, 1999. The legislation required that all private
livestock transactions were to be reported to the South Dakota Department of Agriculture. The
Department of Agriculture collected data until federal mandatory price reporting began. The Secretary of
Agriculture’s office supplied all of the collected mandatory reporting data used in this study.28 The South
Dakota mandatory price reporting data were used to construct a daily weighted average price series for all
live weight steer transactions occurring in the state during the 19-month period prior to implementation of
federal mandatory price reporting. The data provide a unique opportunity to test if the AMS-VPR system
reflected actual market conditions during the period just prior to the implementation of federal MPR.

27

For a discussion of unit root testing procedures and testing for cointegration between non-stationary
time series variables see Gujarati (200 3).
28

In contrast to the dressed weight transaction d ata used in the study by Fausti and Diersen (200 4), we use
live cattle transaction data. Additional information on the characteristics of the South Dakota MPR data set can be
found in the paper by Fausti and Diersen.
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The South Dakota MPR data set contains 80 weeks of daily transaction data. There are 142
transaction days recorded for the direct sale of live steers in South Dakota. The data set contains 59,614
head and 300 recorded transactions.29 The AMS-VPR series selected is the Nebraska Daily Direct
Weighted Average report. The two price series were matched with respect to transaction dates.
Empirical Results: Testing for Unit Roots and Cointegration
In Table I the Dicky-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test statistics are provided for each
of the price series. The test statistic for detecting the presence of serial correlation is either the DurbinWatson d or Durbin’s t, depending on if a lagged dependent variable was needed to whiten the error
structure of the unit root test. Lagged terms were added to the ADF equation until the error structure was
empirically verified as whitened. The unit root tests are based on the null hypothesis that a price series
has a unit root and is non-stationary versus the alternative that the series does not have a unit root and is
stationary. 30 The unit root hypothesis test indicates that both price series are non-stationary (Table I). The
cointegration results are presented in Table II.
TABLE I
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS
Price
Series

Obs.

Tau
Statistic

P-Value

Nebraska Daily Direct
Weighted-Average report.1

142

-0.80

0.81

South Dakota Mandatory
Price Reporting Data.2

142

-1.34

0.61

1. The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0). DW d test stat=1.68
2. The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(1). Durbin’s t= -1.27

29

The mandatory price reporting data set supplied to the Dept. of Economics at SDSU by the State of
South Dakota contains transaction data on over 600 ,000 head of cattle. Dressed weight sales, grid sales, forward
contract sales, marketing agreement transactions, heifer and holstein transactions were excluded from the sample.
Voluntary price report data were collected from various issue of the AMS Livesto ck, M eat and W ool W eekly
Summary and Statistics report (1999-200 1).
30

If serial correlation was not detected in the initial DF test, then the autoregressive order is zero. If serial
correlation was detected then the appropriate ADF test was used.
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TABLE II
SDMPR COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS
Price Series
Cointegrating
Regressions

Number
Of
Obs.31

SDMPR &
Nebraska Daily
Dir. Wt. Avg. 1

142

Cointegrating Regression
Intercept
Parameter
Estimate Estimate

5.14

0.917

Tau
Statistic

-9.27

P-Value

0.001

1. The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0). DW d test stat = 2.025.

The empirical evidence (Table II) suggests a long-run spatial equilibrium relationship did exist
between the South Dakota Mandatory price report series and the Nebraska Direct series and supports
proposition A. The intercept term in Table II can be interpreted as the long-run equilibrium level of
transactions cost associated with selling South Dakota slaughter cattle in the Nebraska market. The
estimate of $5.14 cwt. is reasonable and we conclude the statistical evidence does support the assumption
that marginal profit to spatial arbitrage is zero if the intercept term is empirically verified as being
stationary.
We conclude that there is strong empirical evidence to support the proposition that there was a
robust competitive spatial equilibrium relationship between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for
live slaughter cattle, and their associated price reporting mechanisms, in the period just prior to
implementation of federal mandatory price reporting.
Empirical evidence of the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships, however, does not tell
us anything about short-run deviations away from equilibrium. Short-run divergence from the long-run
equilibrium relationship between the price reporting mechanisms may result from the alleged flaws in the
AMS-VPR system. The literature clearly indicates that interregional integration occurs only if price
shocks are completely transmitted from one region to another. To investigate this issue, an error

31

Statistical analysis was conducted using SAS (19 93).
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correction mechanism will be employed to investigate the effect of short-run anomalies on the long-run
relationship just established.
ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
In the last section we established empirically that there is statistical evidence of long-run spatial
equilibrium relationship linking the South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets and the associated regional
price reports. While the estimated long-run equilibrium relationships are statistically significant, there is
still the question of whether price integration exists across these spatial relationships. Sustained short-run
deviations would be evidence of the failure of the AMS-VPR system to act as an efficient mechanism or
conduit for the transmission of changing market conditions to the public.
An error correction modeling procedure is therefore utilized with the following set of premises
concerning price determination in the cash market for slaughter steers. It is assumed here that the
equilibrium cash price of slaughter steers is determined by regional market conditions outside of South
Dakota. Packers engaged in the direct cash purchase of live slaughter steers in South Dakota are aware of
the current regional market conditions for beef and the transaction costs associated with placing South
Dakota steers into the supply channel. It is also assumed here that the trends in transaction and transport
costs were relatively flat during the time period covered by this study.32 Given these assumptions, a price
shock to the live slaughter steer cash market at the regional level will eventually be reflected in the direct
price paid to South Dakota producers. Simply stated, a price shock of x dollars per cwt. at time t at the
regional level will disrupt the long-run equilibrium between the regional market price and the price paid to
South Dakota producers. The disequilibrium condition will persist until the South Dakota market fully
adjusts to the price shock in some future period t+n, where n is the number of periods (transaction days)
needed for full adjustment to take place (eq.7). It is during this period of disequilibrium that price

32

During the time period covered by this study the average Midwest retail weekly #2 diesel price per
gallon was $1.41 and the standard deviation was 12 cents (U.S. Dept. Of Energy, Energy Information
Administratio n).
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transparency can be affected.33 The length of time (n) it takes for the transmission of a price shock opens a
window of opportunity for profitable arbitrage activities to occur in smaller decentralized markets like
South Dakota.34
Based on the work by Granger (1981, 1983), the Granger Representation Theorem states that if
two time series variables are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can be expressed as an error
correction mechanism (ECM). The ECM defined in eq.5 is estimated using OLS:
8) ) PtMA = (0 + (1 ) PtVB + (2 et-1 + zt ,
zt is the random error term, and the empirical estimates are provided in Table III.35
TABLE III
ERROR CORRECTION MODEL OLS ESTIMATES
Price Series
ECM
Regressions

Number
Of
Obs.

)SDMPR &
)Nebraska Daily
Dir. Wt. Avg.

142

ECM Regression Estimates 1
Intercept
Slope
Speed of
Est.
Est.
Adjustment
Est.

0.03
(0.29)

0.752
(6.62)

-0.755
(-9.16)

1. Student t test statistics are given in parentheses below the respective parameter estimate.

Table III indicates that the intercept estimate is statistically zero. This result implies that
transaction costs were stationary during the period investigated in this study. However, this result is also
consistent with our conclusion concerning spatial arbitrage and strategic price reporting. We assert that
there is empirical evidence to support the proposition B and conclude that these market distortions, if they

33

Koontz (1999) reported that packers and feedlots are more likely to withhold transaction information
during periods of sharp price movements. However, empirical evidence does not support this type of market
disrup ting behavior affecting the interre gional spatial relationship in this stud y.
34

The possibility of excess profit potential arising in this type of situation has been alluded to by
Go odw in and Schroed er (19 91) and T ome k (19 80).
35

The first difference variables used to estimate the ECM were screened for serial correlation (DW: 2.042)
and stationarity, and no diagnostic problem s were detected.
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existed, did not materially affect the long-run competitive spatial price relationships between the South
Dakota and Nebraska cash markets and their respective price reporting systems.
Empirical evidence presented in Table III indicates the slope parameter estimate is highly
significant and has a p-value of less than .001. The “speed of adjustment” parameter estimate is also
highly significant and has a p-value of less than .001. The “speed of adjustment” parameter coefficient
estimates indicate the proportion of the price-shock-residual remaining after period t that will be
transmitted to the SDMPR series in period t+1. The slope and speed of adjustment parameter estimates
and their respective standard errors are very consistent with the modeling assumption made earlier that (1
= (2 . 36
Market integration occurs when a price shock completely passes through from one market to
another in a timely fashion. When market integration coexists with competitive spatial equilibrium, then
the conditions for Barrett and Li’s definition of “perfect integration” are satisfied. Table IV provides
evidence of the existence of market integration. The evidence from Tables II and IV support the
coexistence of competitive spatial equilibrium and market integration. We therefore conclude that the
South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets and the associated price reporting mechanisms meet the
conditions for prefect integration and the AMS-VPR system did provide spatial price transparency to
market participants in these markets. Table IV provides empirical estimates for the speed of adjustment
process.

36

This implies the institutional structure of the price transmission mechanism is stable within the spatial
equilibrium relationship between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets, and the AM S-VPR system reflected this
stability. Of interest is the implication that while price discovery and price determination are dynamic, the
instructional structure of the price transmission mechanism is static. Stability of the price transm ission mechanism is
a vital co mpo nent of an efficient market and this issue has not received a lot of attention in the literature.
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TABLE IV
SOUTH DAKOTA MANDATORY PRICE REPORTING SERIES:
“SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT” OVER TIME TO A PRICE SHOCK AT TIME t
Cointegrating
Regressions

SDMPR &
Nebraska Daily
Dir. Wt. Avg.

t

TIME
t+1

t+2

75.2%

93.98%

98.52%

The ECM estimates indicate that 94% of a price shock occurring in the Nebraska cash market was
transmitted to the South Dakota cash market by the next transaction day and 98.5% by day two. The
empirical evidence indicates that while the AMS-VPR system did not provide instantaneous spatial price
transparency, but spatial price transparency did exist.
Conclusions and Summary
For the period when South Dakota required mandatory livestock reporting, we find the spatial relationship
between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets and their respective price reporting regimes for live
slaughter cattle are consistent with Barrett and Li’s concept of “perfect integration.” The theoretical
framework developed allows for the empirical testing of the market distortion hypothesis found in the
literature, which raised concern over the efficiency of the AMS-VPR system. We found no evidence that
noncompetitive spatial arbitrage, thinning market information, or strategic price reporting had a material
effect on the functioning of the AMS-VPR system in the South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for live
slaughter cattle. The conclusion from the empirical evidence presented is that in the case of South
Dakota and Nebraska, the former voluntary price reporting system did foster spatial price transparency
and was a robust mechanism for promoting price discovery.
While our study only covers one small corner of the livestock sector, this South Dakota case study
supports the previously published results of Fausti and Diersen and extends the literature by providing a
theoretical and empirical framework for modeling and testing for market distortions in markets where
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prices are reported as public information. Our contribution establishes the conditions necessary for a VPR
system to provide price transparency and foster price discovery in cash markets based on the work by
Barrett and Li, but within a linear cointegration framework. Finally, we are not advocating that the former
AMS-VPR system is more robust than the new federal mandatary system, but we are saying there is ample
evidence that the former system was not as flawed as previous research has suggested. Therefore, it is not
necessarily valid to justify the need for mandatory price reporting based on the assertion that the former
voluntary price reporting system degraded price transparency. This last point is relevant, given that
federal MPR legislation will expire in September 2005.
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